203 Appendix D THE CHANGING POLITICAL-MILITARY ENVIRONMENT: SOUTH ASIA Ashley J. Tellis The guarantor environment in south Asia has remained relatively un-settled since the Indian and Pakistani atomic tests of May 1998. The Indian g everywherenments groundss to in ordinary emphasize the challenges china posed in the weeks stellar(a) up to those testsafter more(prenominal) than a ecstasy of mostly sotto voce complaintsserved to lose it the or-dinarily glacial process of normalizing Sino-Indian relations. This process unceasingly possessed a certain fragility in that the gradually de-creasing tensions along the Sino-Indian deposit did non automatically translate into increased trust amongst capital of Red mainland China and innovative Delhi. Even as almost(prenominal) sides desire to derive tactical advantages from the confi-dence- building measures they had negotiated since 1993for ex-ample, the drawdown of forces along the utterly unfriendly LAC in the Himala yas for each one ended up pursuing larger luxe strategies that effectively undercut the others interests. Beijing, for example, per-sisted in covertly assisting the thermo thermo thermo atomic and rocket programs of Indias local competitor, Pakistan, bandage new Delhi desire in re-sponse to part an intermediate-range ballistic missile whose comparative receipts lay primarily in targeting China. The tell identification of China as a threat to Indian interests by both Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leaders and other important Indian elites in the first half of 1998 not single underscored the fragile disposition of the Sino-Indian rapprochement but in like manner ruptured the guardedly maintained façade of improving relations between the twain coun-204 The United States and Asia tries.1 When this humans finger plosiveing ultimately gave way to Indias resumption of thermo atomic test on May 11, 1998 (an character ac-companied by the Indian prime ministers univocal claim that those tests were control by the! hostile actions of Indias Union neighbor over the years), security competition in atomic number 16 Asiawhich usually appears, at least in popular perceptions, as merely a bilateral affair between India and Pakistan hithertotually revealed itself as the voiceal strategic triangle2 it has always been. This appendix analyzes Indian and Pakistani attitudes toward China in the linguistic context of the triangular security competition in South Asia. fetching the 1998 nuclear tests as its point of departure, it assesses how China figures in the grand strategies of the twain principal give ins in the Indian subcontinent and identifies the principal regional geopolitical contingencies for which the United States should pre-pare over the next decade. Finally, it briefly analyzes the kinds of opportunities the region offers to the air force as it engages, even as it prepares to hedge against, a wage hike China. NUCLEAR TESTING AND THE TRIANGULAR SECURITY contender IN SOUTH ASIA Impa ct of the Nuclear Tests on Sino-Indian dealing Although Pakistan was instantly affected by the Indian nuclear tests, these tests busy Chinese security interests as well. To begin with, Indias finale to add up testing made manifest New Delhis re-sentment toward Beijing for its almost two-decade-long assistance to capital of Pakistans nuclear and missile programs. Indias official claim that its resumption of nuclear testing was precipitated at least in part by mixed Chinese actions (such as the transfer of nuclear weapon designs, short-range ballistic missiles, and assorted technologies in-tended to enable Islamabad to produce strategic systems indige-nously) was meant to signal the fact that India was capable of ______________ 1 These azoic 1998 events launcher been summarized in Manoj Joshi, George in the China Shop, India Today, May 18, 1998, pp. 1016. 2 For a estimable discussion, see Brahma Chellaney, The regional strategical Triangle, in Brahma Chellaney (ed.), Secu ring Indias Future in the New Millennium, New Delhi: ! Orient Longman, 1999, pp. 313336.The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia 205 argue its own security interestsif necessary through slanted solutionsand that benefit in almost aspects of Sino-Indian bilateral relations could not be sustained if it came at the expense of undercutting the core intent of preserving Indias safety, integrity, and primacy in South Asia.3 Further, the purpose to test and the financial record that India would de-velop a nuclear deterrent implied that New Delhi would at some point seek to target China with nuclear weapons. This causal agent at re-placing abject vulnerability with mutual vulnerabilityno matter how asymmetrical it might besuggested that Indian policymakers were offhand to hang their hopes solely on the peacefulness of Chinese intentions, in particular over the long term, given that Beijings big businessman is expected to grow even except and the relative derivative in its strategic capabilities vis-à -vis New Delhi is in all probability to become even more manifest. Indias decision to prove a nuclear deterrent thus suggests that India seeks at a minimum to possess the kinds of deter-rent capabilities that result immunize it against possible Chinese nu-clear coerce in the event of a crisis.4 Finally, Indias decision to resume nuclear testing has also been complemented by an fret to modernize the Indian militaryan ef-fort that has encompassed upgrading Indias conventional forces, including those elements tasked with defend the mountainous run into areas facing both Pakistan and China. This modernization, which slowed down during the nineties for financial reasons, is likely to gather momentum during the coming decade as Indian security managers increasingly recognize that, irrespective of what happens in the land of diplomatic relations, maintaining robust conven-tional capabilities remains not only the vanquish insurance against deter-rence breakdown but also a resilient preconditio n for making good on Indias public pledge never to us! e nuclear weapons first.5 ______________ 3 This matter is emphasized in J.
Mohan Malik, India Goes Nuclear: Rationale, Benefits, cost and Implications, Contemporary southeasterly Asia, Vol. 20, nary(prenominal) 2, August 1998, pp. 191215. 4 The vital importance of deterring blackmail in Indian calculations is of age(p) high schoollighted in Jasjit Singh, wherefore Nuclear Weapons? in Jasjit Singh (ed.), Nuclear India, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998, pp. 925. 5 For more on this calculus, see Tellis (2001). 206 The United States and Asia The Sino-Indian agreement Indias novel decision to conduct nuclear tests , to develop a nuclear deterrent, and to accelerate the oft-postponed modernization of its conventional forces has ofttimes engendered the conclusion that New Delhi now views Beijing as a clear and make up danger to its secu-rity. In point of fact, this is not the case. To be sure, the Indian capi-tal would appear to be hard populated by individuals, work out tanks, and associations who vociferously raise the imminence of the Chi-nese threat. These claims are usually base either on Western reve-lations about Beijings assistance to Islamabads nuclear and missile programs and its turbid activities in Burma or, alternatively, on dis-tant fears such as the prospect of a rapidly outgrowth China returning to complete its docket of topic reunion at a time when it will have dramatically surpassed India in most of the relevant cate-gories of national might.6 These challenges, however fleck ac-knowledged both by elected Indian officials and by the high bureaucracy in New Delhihave not produced the kinds of reactions Indian commentat! ors have often expected because, repose simply, In-dias state managers have a more than better grasp of the Sino-Indian power balance than many analysts give them cite for. For more than a decade, Indian policymakers have in public pur-sued a sharp policy toward Beijing. Although the forceful statements of several Indian leaders in the months surrounding the nuclear tests were exceptions to this rule, more modern Indian initiatives vis-Ã -vis Chinaincluding the June 1999 visit of Indian Foreign diplomatic minister Jas neediness Singh to Beijingsuggest that Indias China policy has belatedly swung back from the extreme of polemical criticism to a overmuch more centrist effort at realistically managing the complexness and tensions inherent in the Sino-Indian relationship.7 The logic of this effort can high hat be appreciated in the context of un-derstanding the perceptions of senior Indian security managers with ______________ 6 These concerns are summarized in Amitabh Ma ttoo, complacency round Chinese Threat Called Frightening, India Abroad, April 5, 1996. 7 A good comment of the complexity of Sino-Indian relations can be found in Surjit Mansingh, Sino-Indian Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1994, pp. 285300. If you want to get a full essay, run it on our website:
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