U.S. National Interest in the Middle East & Israel's U.S. Supporters

Since the second chapter of this study was drafted, the agent of the Israel lobby was again demonstrated by the political mankind press in Congress which forced the Bush Administration to intimately scale back its planned package arms sales to Saudi Arabia  a package, ironically, designed to enhance Saudi Arabia's top executive to defend itself against the same Iraqi threat against which some two hundred thousand American troops are instantaneously arrayed in the Saudi desert.

Because the Israel lobby is so important in the shaping of U.S. policy in the midsection East, we cannot richly discuss the problem of defining U.S. national interests in the optic East without considering those interest as seen through the Israeli lobby's reflect  their perception, which is ultimately the Israeli perception, of Israel's own national interests in the Middle East. Only when the forces shaping Israeli perceptions have been analysed, and a role model for Israeli interests in the Middle East established, can we fully solve the problem of U.S. interests in the Middle East. The influence of the Israel lobby, later on all, is not going to disappear from American public life. take down if a stronger ArabAmerican lobby were to emerge as a balancing influence, Israeli nationalsecurity concerns would remain a major factor shaping U.S. policy towards the Middle East. We mustiness therefore turn in part from the U.S. to Israel it

Such an outcome implies, first, a deepening of plebeian confidence in the midst of the U.S. and its current Arab partners, including  most disturbingly from the Israeli perspective  Syria. A negotiated settlement would present the American public with the image of Arabs as reliable quasiallies and true(predicate) negotiating partners. The removal of U.S. land forces from the region would lessen tensions resulting from the stationing of U.S. troops on Arab soil. Above all, a negotiated end to the Arabian Gulf crisis would greatly increase pressure on Israel to accept a negotiated accession to the Palestinian question.

Moreover, the Reagan Administration came to power explicitly opposed to the " gentleman's gentleman rights" emphasis of the Carter Administration.

In other parts of the world, notably key America, it was affiliated to strong support for rightistauthoritarian regimes that only the greatest stretch of the imagination could see as "democratic." Moreover, it was committed to a more forceful pose of confrontation against the Soviet Union. Underlying all of these positions was a gen successionl desire to present toughmindedness and "resolve," in U.S. policy, in contrast to fuzzy Carterera humanitarianism. It thus suited the whole tenor of the Reagan Administration to stress the strategic element in a proIsraeli policy, while such an emphasis was of great value presumptuousness the gradual erosion of sentimental American support for Israel.

In effect, as Walter Russell Means (1987) has argued, the Sephardi Jews of Israel found themselves in the same frugal and social situation as Afrikaners in South Africa or "poor whites" in the American South. Squeezed between the Ashkanazi elite and the Palestinian Arabs, they reacted politically as Afrikaners did who were squeezed between the Englishspeaking sparing and social elite in South Africa and the black majority, or as poor whites in the American South did when squeezed between the plantation elite and the descende
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